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The paper proposes a model of collateralized bank and trade credit. Firms use a two-input technology. Assuming 
that the supplier is better able to extract value from existing assets and has an information advantage over other 
creditors, the paper derives a series of predictions. (1) Financially unconstrained firms (with unused bank credit 
lines) take trade credit for a liquidation motive. (2) The reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit 
rationing, if inputs are liquid enough. (3) Firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those 
buying services, while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods. (4) 
Suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash. (5) Greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more 
intensive use of tangible inputs. (6) Better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input 
tangibility. 
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   Introduction
Firms procure funds not only from specialized ﬁnancial intermediaries but also from suppliers, generally
by delaying payments. The empirical evidence on trade credit raises questions that are hard to reconcile
with existing theories. First, what justiﬁes its widespread use by ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms that
have access to seemingly cheaper alternative sources? Second, why is the reliance on trade credit not
always increasing in the degree of credit rationing? Third, why do suppliers regularly extend credit by
allowing delayed payment but seldom by lending cash? Last, does input lending have an impact on the
borrower’s choice of inputs? And, relatedly, are the ﬁnancing and input choices aﬀected by the degree
of creditor protection? This paper addresses all these questions in a uniﬁed framework.
There is a general consensus that trade credit is most common among ﬁrms that face borrowing
constraints. This follows from the assumption that trade credit is more expensive than bank loans.1
According to this view, reliance on trade credit should increase in credit rationing, but the empirical
evidence is not generally consistent with this common belief. Petersen and Rajan (1997) present evidence
for the U.S. that large ﬁrms (presumably less likely to be credit-constrained) rely more heavily on trade
credit than small ﬁrms, accounts payable averaging 11.6% and 4.4% of sales for large and small ﬁrms
respectively.2 Similarly, for the Italian manufacturing sector, Marotta (2005) documents that trade
credit ﬁnances on average 38.1% of the input purchases of non-rationed ﬁrms, and 37.5% of rationed
ones.3
A common feature in the use of trade credit, which is independent of the degree of credit rationing,
is that the supplier’s lending is tied closely to the value of the input. That is, suppliers readily lend
inputs, but seldom cash. Given that not all inputs can be purchased on account,4 trade credit is likely to
go together with some bias in the input combination. This seems to be conﬁrmed by scattered evidence
on ﬁnancing and technological choices. Some papers ﬁnd greater use of trade credit in countries with
less creditor protection, such as developing countries (see, among others, Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La
1The evidence on trade credit as a more expensive source of ﬁnancing than bank loans is mostly anecdotal (Petersen
and Rajan, 1997; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999; Wilner, 2000). In support of this thesis, scholars generally cite the canonical
“2/10 net 30” agreement (a 2% discount for payment within 10 days, with the net price charged for payment within 30
days), which implies an eﬀective interest rate of more than 40% for those who do not take the discount. But it is not clear
how widespread this kind of agreement actually is.
2Petersen and Rajan (1997) also ﬁnd that ﬁrms that have been denied credit in the previous year receive more trade
credit. However, the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant.
3Marotta (2005) uses data from a survey conducted by the bank Mediocredito Centrale in 1994. Credit-constrained
ﬁrms are identiﬁed by two questions: “In 1994, has the ﬁrm applied for, but not obtained, more bank loans?” and “in
1994, would the ﬁrm have accepted tighter terms (higher interest rates or higher collateral requirements) to obtain more
bank loan?”
4For example, intangible assets cannot generally be ﬁnanced by trade credit.
1Porta et al., 1998; Fisman and Love, 2003; Frank and Maksimovic, 2004). Further, there is evidence that
ﬁrms in developing countries have a higher proportion of ﬁxed assets and fewer intangibles than ﬁrms
in developed countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001). Although fragmented, these ﬁndings
suggest the existence of a cross-country correlation between ﬁnancing and input choices and identify
the degree of creditor protection as a possible explanation.
To account for the foregoing stylized facts, we propose a model with collateralized bank and trade
credit. Firms are opportunistic and face uncertain demand. They choose between two sources of
external funding (bank and trade credit) and two types of input with diﬀerent degrees of observability
and collateral value (tangibles and intangibles). Firms may face borrowing constraints. Banks are
specialized intermediaries and have a cost advantage in providing ﬁnance. Suppliers have both an
information and a liquidation advantage. The former consists in observing input transactions costlessly,
which enables them to provide credit to relax the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints, i.e. for incentive reasons.
The second advantage derives from the supplier’s ability to extract a greater liquidation value from the
inputs collateralized in case of default. Uncertainty and multiple inputs in a model with moral hazard
are the key notions used to address the open questions listed above.
An original feature of our model is the explanation of why ﬁrms with unused lines of bank credit
may demand trade credit: even they may beneﬁt from the liquidation advantage of their supplier. This
advantage makes trade credit cheaper than bank loans, oﬀsetting the banks’ lower cost of funds.
The liquidation advantage is suﬃcient by itself to explain the demand for trade credit by ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrms; the interaction between the liquidation and the information advantage helps show
why reliance on trade credit does not always increase with the stringency of ﬁnancing constraints.
Financially constrained ﬁrms may take trade credit for both reasons. If it is for the incentive, credit-
rationed ﬁrms ﬁnance a larger share of their inputs by trade credit than do non-rationed ﬁrms, as
theoretical literature holds. Conversely, when the liquidation motive dominates, the share of inputs
purchased on account remains constant across ﬁrms with diﬀerent degrees of credit rationing.
Moreover, the relationship between the use of trade credit and ﬁnancial constraints depends crucially
on the characteristics of the inputs. Firms whose inputs are highly liquid (e.g., standardized inputs)
or high collateral value (e.g., diﬀerentiated inputs) are more likely to use trade credit, to exploit the
liquidation advantage of the supplier. Conversely, the incentive motive is more likely to dominate among
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms using illiquid inputs with low collateral value (e.g., services). We derive
several testable predictions on how trade credit demand and supply vary across industries: buyers of
goods (both diﬀerentiated and standardized) make more purchases on account than buyers of services,
2but suppliers of services oﬀer more trade credit than suppliers of standardized goods.
Regardless of the motives underlying the use of trade credit, suppliers always ﬁnance the inputs they
sell but they never lend cash. This result follows from the assumption that suppliers observe only their
own transaction. If they could also observe the input purchases from other suppliers, cash lending would
arise endogenously. To our knowledge, the only available evidence of cash lending concerns Japanese
trading companies (Uesugi and Yamashiro, 2004), which typically feature a substantial involvement
of suppliers in the ﬁrm’s activity, owing to an organizational structure that guarantees continuous
information ﬂow from clients to suppliers. This feature is consistent with our theoretical ﬁndings.
The absence of cash lending by suppliers implies that trade credit can only be used to ﬁnance speciﬁc
inputs, which in our setting are tangibles. It follows that whenever trade credit is used to relax ﬁnancial
constraints, a credit-rationed business can beneﬁt from it only by distorting its input combination. This
introduces a link between ﬁnancing and input decisions, which we explore to derive new predictions.
More intensive use of trade credit goes together with a technology biased towards tangible assets, and
the bias increases as the legal protection of creditors weakens. These predictions reconcile the scattered
international evidence discussed above (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La Porta et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic, 2001).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a sketch of the literature. Section
2 describes the model. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 explores the eﬀect on our
predictions of considering bankruptcy and commercial laws. Section 5 concludes.
1 Related literature
The literature on trade credit has sought to explain why agents should want to borrow from ﬁrms rather
than from ﬁnancial intermediaries. The traditional explanation is that trade credit plays a non-ﬁnancial
role. That is, it reduces transaction costs (Ferris, 1981), allows price discrimination between customers
with diﬀerent creditworthiness (Brennan et al., 1988), fosters long-term relationships with customers
(Summers and Wilson, 2002), and even provides a warranty for quality when customers cannot observe
product characteristics (Long et al., 1993).
These non-ﬁnancial theories can explain the existence of trade credit, but they do not oﬀer any
prediction on how borrowing constraints aﬀect the demand for trade credit, since none of them explicitly
models credit rationing. Financial theories have attempted to ﬁll this gap (Biais and Gollier, 1997;
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004, among others), positing that in lending the supplier has an advantage over
3ﬁnancial institutions. In Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), whose analysis is closest to ours, suppliers have an
informational advantage that mitigates their exposure to borrowers’ opportunism. Suﬃciently rich ﬁrms,
without incentive problems, never need trade credit. Poorer ﬁrms, which do have incentive problems,
face credit rationing by banks, and here suppliers’ informational advantage becomes relevant, as they
can ease borrowing constraints by extending trade credit to their customers. Similarly, Biais and Gollier
(1997) propose a screening model in which the provision of trade credit signals the creditworthiness of
the buyer and thus mitigates credit rationing.
However, both of these papers, and ﬁnancial theories of trade credit in general, fail to explain: (i)
why trade credit is also used by ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms; and (ii) why resort to trade credit
does not necessarily increase with the severity of ﬁnancial constraints, as the empirical literature shows
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Marotta, 2005). In order to distinguish between rationed and non-rationed
ﬁrms, we model the information advantage as in Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) but interact it with a
liquidation advantage, which can explain why even wealthy ﬁrms may wish to take up trade credit. The
liquidation advantage of suppliers, when it exceeds the bank’s intermediation advantage, justiﬁes the
use of trade credit by rationed and unrationed ﬁrms alike, which squares with the evidence that ﬁrms
facing diﬀerent degrees of credit rationing nevertheless tend to rely on trade credit to the same extent.
The thesis that trade credit is a means of exploiting the supplier’s liquidation advantage has been
tested in various empirical works (Mian and Smith, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1997, among others).
Frank and Maksimovic (2004) have also modeled the eﬀects of this advantage theoretically, showing
that it makes trade credit cheaper than bank ﬁnancing. In their framework, however, bank credit is
never rationed, so that no prediction on the demand for trade credit by ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms
can be derived.5
Finally, the literature has disregarded the relations between ﬁnancing and input decisions and oﬀered
no explanation of why ﬁrms lend only inputs. The use of a multi-input technology allows us to ﬁll these
gaps.
2 The model
A risk-neutral entrepreneur has an investment project that uses a tangible and an intangible input.
The tangible input can be interpreted as raw material and physical capital, intangibles as skilled labor.
5In their model, in order to extend trade credit suppliers must borrow from banks. This intermediary role of suppliers
creates an adverse selection problem that induces banks to ration credit to suppliers. These, in turn, will ration creditworthy
customers, who then turn to bank credit. Hence, banks will not ration credit to customer ﬁrms.
4Let qt and qnt denote respectively the amount of tangible and intangible inputs purchased and It ≤ qt,
Int ≤ qnt, the amount of such inputs invested. The purchase of inputs is observed only by their suppliers.
The amount invested is totally unobservable and is converted into a veriﬁable state-contingent output
yσ, with σ ∈ {H,L} and yH > yL = 0. The high state (σ = H) occurs with probability p. Uncertainty
aﬀects production through demand: at times of high demand, invested inputs produce output according
to an increasing and strictly concave production function fH (It,Int). At times of low demand, there is
no output, and the ﬁrm’s worth is only the scrap value of unused inputs. Inputs are substitutes, but a
positive amount of each is essential for production.
The entrepreneur is a price-taker both in the input and in the output market. The output price is
normalized to 1, and so are those of tangible and intangible inputs.6
To carry out the project, the entrepreneur uses observable internal wealth (A) as well as external
funding from competitive banks (LB ≥ 0) and/or suppliers (LS ≥ 0). Banks and suppliers play diﬀerent
roles. Banks lend cash. The supplier of intangibles provides the input, which is fully paid for in cash.
The supplier of tangibles sells the input, but can also act as a ﬁnancier, lending both inputs and cash.7
Moral hazard. Unobservability of investment to all parties and of input purchases to parties
other than the supplier raise a problem of moral hazard: the entrepreneur might not invest the funds
raised, either in cash or in kind, in the venture, but divert them to private uses.8 This problem limits
the amount of credit the entrepreneur can obtain from ﬁnanciers. However, the supplier can observe
whether inputs have been purchased. This advantage together with the lesser liquidity of inputs than
cash implies that moral hazard is less severe when funding comes from the supplier and not the bank. In
particular, one unit of cash gives the entrepreneur a return φ < 1 if diverted, where φ can be interpreted
as the degree of vulnerability of creditor rights; one unit of the tangible input qt gives a return φβt if
diverted, where βt < 1 denotes the tangible input liquidity. When βt is close to 1, the input can be resold
at near the purchase price and converted into a monetary beneﬁt.9 Lastly, diverting the intangible input
qnt gives a zero return. This implies that it is not possible to extract monetary beneﬁts from workers
6This normalization is without loss of generality since we use a partial equilibrium setting.
7A remark on terminology is in order here. Henceforth, trade credit refers to credit, either in cash or in-kind, provided
by the supplier. Strictly speaking, however, the term should be used only for in-kind ﬁnance and should not include any
cash lending. We ﬁnd that in equilibrium the supplier never lends cash but only inputs, which makes our terminology
consistent. We will address this issue in Section 3.4.
8The assumption of full unobservability of input purchase to parties other than the direct supplier implies that the
bank cannot condition the contract on qt or on a share of that. This is a useful simpliﬁcation but is not crucial to obtain
our results. We only need to postulate that the supplier has some information/monitoring advantage relative to the bank.
This can consist in getting more accurate information, or in getting the same information at a lower cost. Both situations
are reasonable given the speciﬁc nature of the ﬁrm-supplier relationship.
9For example, standardized products, which can be used by many diﬀerent customers, have high re-sale value (high
βt), while perishable goods, services and customized inputs (diﬀerentiated) are less liquid (low βt).
5by assigning them to tasks other than those they were hired for. In many countries, such practices are
indeed prohibited by labor law.
Collateral value. Inputs have value when repossessed in default.10 We assume that only tangibles
can be pledged, while intangibles have zero collateral value. Hence, the total value of pledgeable
collateral is It. However, diﬀerent ﬁnanciers have diﬀerent liquidation abilities. We deﬁne βiIt as the
liquidation value extracted by a given ﬁnancier in case of default, with i = B,S referring to bank or
supplier. The supplier has a better knowledge of the resale market, so we assume βS > βB.
Finally, the cost of raising one unit of funds on the market is assumed to be higher for the supplier
than for the bank (rB < rS). This is consistent with the special role of banks. Moreover, suppliers are
likely to be credit-constrained themselves and to face a higher cost of raising funds than banks.
Contracts. The entrepreneur-bank contract speciﬁes: {LB,Rσ
B (yσ,LB),γ}, where LB is the loan,
Rσ
B ≥ 0 is the state-contingent repayment obligation and γ is the share of the collateral obtained in case
of default. That with the supplier of the tangible input speciﬁes {qt,LS,Rσ
S (yσ,LS),(1−γ)}, where qt
is the input provision, LS is the amount of credit, Rσ
S ≥ 0 is the repayment obligation and (1−γ) is the
share of the collateral. Notice that unlike the bank the supplier can condition the contract also on the
input purchase qt. Last, given that the intangible input is fully paid for when purchased, the contract
between entrepreneur and supplier speciﬁes the amount of the input purchased, qnt.
All parties have limited liability protection.
The sequence of events is summarized in the following diagram:
.
10We assume that the entrepreneur cannot divert unused inputs if the bad state realizes (i.e. ex-post diversion is not
allowed). However, allowing for this case does not alter our qualitative results, as long as some minimal share of the assets
cannot be hidden (e.g., the premises of the ﬁrm, or heavy machinery).
6Optimization problem. Firms maximize proﬁts, which can be split into two components: the
return from production (EP) and from diversion (D). The expected return from production is
EP = p





+ (1 − p)






Since output is zero in the bad state, limited liability implies that the repayments to banks and suppliers
in this state are both zero (RL
B = RL
S = 0).11
The return from diversion is
D = φ{βt (qt − It) + [A + LB + LS − qt]},
where the term in round brackets denotes the return from tangible input diversion, net of the amount
invested in production, and that in square brackets denotes the return from residual cash diversion
(the amount of cash not spent on the input purchase). Notice that an opportunistic entrepreneur only
purchases tangibles (qt ≥ It ≥ 0) and never intangibles for diversion (qnt = Int = 0).12 Moreover, the
ineﬃcient diversion technology (φ < 1) implies that partial diversion is never optimal. Thus, either all
funds (and inputs) are used for investment (D = 0), or they are diverted, in which case none of the
purchased inputs is invested: It = 0.13





EP + φ[βtqt + A + LB − (qt − LS)] (2)
s.t. EP ≥ φ(A + LB), (3)
EP ≥ φ[βtqt + A + LB − (qt − LS)], (4)
pRH
B + (1 − p)γβBIt ≥ LBrB, (5)
pRH
S + (1 − p)(1 − γ)βSIt ≥ LSrS, (6)
Int + It ≥ A + LB + LS, (7)
RH
S ≥ (1 − γ)βSIt, (8)
11Banks and suppliers can still get a repayment in the bad state by sharing in the scrap value of unused inputs.
12This is obvious since intangibles are postulated to have zero liquidity, but the result also holds for any positive liquidity
of the intangible.
13Suppose the entrepreneur invests an amount suﬃcient to repay the loan in full. Diverting the marginal unit gives a
return φβt. Investing it in production, the ﬁrm gets the expected marginal product, which in the ﬁrst-best case equals
rB [1 − βS/rS]. If φ < 1, the return from diversion is lower than the return from production. Thus, the entrepreneur
always prefers to invest the marginal unit, and more so for the inframarginal units. Suppose instead that the entrepreneur
invests an amount not suﬃcient to repay the loan in full. Because output is observable, any return from production will
be claimed by creditors. It is better then to divert all inputs.
7where (3) is the incentive compatibility condition vis- ` a-vis the bank, which prevents the entrepreneur
from diverting internal funds as well as the credit raised from the bank, and (4) is the incentive constraint
vis-` a-vis the supplier, preventing the entrepreneur from diverting inputs and cash. Under conditions (3)
and (4), there is no diversion in equilibrium, so that D = 0 and qt = It. (5) and (6) are the participation
constraints of the bank and the supplier, respectively, requiring that the lenders’ expected returns cover
at least the opportunity cost of funds. Competition in banking and among suppliers implies that (5)
and (6) are binding. The resource constraint (7) requires that input purchase cannot exceed available
funds. Last, condition (8) requires repayment of the supplier to be non-decreasing in revenues.14
Notice that if creditor protection is high enough (φ small), even a zero-wealth entrepreneur has no
incentive problems (constraints (3) and (4) are always slack) and can fund the optimal investment. To
exclude this uninteresting case, we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 1 : φ > φ.15
The Liquidation Motive - LM. Assume constraints (3) and (4) are slack. Constraints (5), (6)
and (8) identify the liquidation motive for trade credit demand. As βS > βB, pledging the collateral
to the supplier relaxes his participation constraint more than the bank’s. As a consequence, the total
repayment due from the entrepreneur in the good state decreases and total surplus increases. However,
rB < rS implies that the entrepreneur prefers bank credit to trade credit, i.e., LS = 0. Having the
supplier acting as a liquidator without taking any trade credit implies, using constraint (6), RH
S < 0.
As we are interested in the supplier’s role as ﬁnancier, we do not allow for such contracts and require
repayment to be non-negative. Solving (6) for RH
S , condition (8) implies a lower bound on trade credit
equal to the collateral value of the inputs pledged to the supplier:




However, supplier’s ﬁnance is proﬁtable (LS > 0) only if his opportunity cost of funds rS, discounted
for the saving in repayment obtained by pledging the collateral to the supplier rather than to the bank,
is lower than the opportunity cost of funds of the bank rB:
Assumption 2 rS ≤ rB

βS
pβS + (1 − p)βB

.
When this condition holds, the higher opportunity cost of funds of the supplier is oﬀset by the higher
proceeds in case of liquidation. Under Assumption 2, we derive the following lemma (unless otherwise
stated, proofs of lemmas and propositions are given in Appendix 2):
14This condition is standard in the literature (Innes, 1990).
15The value of φ is deﬁned in Appendix 2.
8Lemma 1 At equilibrium, γ = 0, i.e. the right to repossess and liquidate the collateral goes to the
supplier.
Under Lemma 1, condition (9) sets the trade credit demand for liquidation motives equal to the





The incentive motive - IM. In addition to extracting more value from assets, trade credit
can also relax ﬁnancial constraints on the entrepreneur. Since diverting inputs is less proﬁtable than
diverting cash, the supplier is less vulnerable than banks to borrowers’ opportunism and may thus be
willing to provide credit when the bank is not ((3) is binding). In this case, the demand for trade credit
is above the level deﬁned by (10) and trade credit is taken for incentive motives. However, suppliers
are not willing to meet all possible requests, since supplying too many inputs on credit may induce the
entrepreneur to divert them all. The maximum trade credit extended for incentive motives is
LS,IMmax = (1 − βt)It, (11)
which obtains when both incentive constraints (3) and (4) are binding. Notice that (1 − βt) measures
the extent to which the supplier’s informational advantage reduces moral hazard. If inputs are as liquid
as cash (βt = 1), this advantage is ineﬀective. The supplier cannot oﬀer any trade credit when banks
ration cash. Conversely, if inputs are illiquid, the informational advantage becomes important. The
maximum line of trade credit is positive, and is greater the less liquid the inputs.
From the foregoing it follows that there are two types of demand for trade credit. One derives
from the liquidation advantage of the supplier and depends on the collateral value. The second arises
from his informational advantage and depends on the borrowing constraints on the ﬁrm (hence on the
entrepreneur’s wealth) and on input liquidity. Two regimes may then arise, depending on whether or
not the liquidation motive demand (10) exceeds the maximum credit line extended for incentive motives
(11). This condition can be redeﬁned exclusively in terms of the parameters of the model as follows:
βS
rS
− (1 − βt) Q 0. (12)
Having deﬁned the determinants of trade credit use, let us now turn to the results.
93 Results
Our results are presented in ﬁve parts. Section 3.1 identiﬁes two regimes and examines how trade credit
varies with entrepreneur’s wealth between regimes. Section 3.2 focuses on the trade credit demand of
ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms. Section 3.3 links the dominance of each regime to observable industry
characteristics. Section 3.4 discusses the issue of cash lending by suppliers, and Section 3.5 investigates
the relation between ﬁnancing, technology and borrowing constraints.
3.1 Trade credit and two alternative regimes
As shown in Section 2, trade credit may be taken for liquidation or for incentive reasons. The way these
two motives interact across diﬀerent levels of wealth depends on condition (12). When (12) is strictly
negative, wealthy entrepreneurs take trade credit for liquidation motives (LM), the less wealthy for
incentive motives (IM). The share of inputs purchased on credit is non-increasing in wealth and larger
for entrepreneurs that are credit-rationed. We deﬁne this regime as dominant incentive motive. When
(12) is positive or zero, all entrepreneurs, regardless of wealth, take trade credit for liquidation reasons
and the share of inputs purchased on credit is the same for rationed and non-rationed ﬁrms. We deﬁne
this regime as dominant liquidation motive.
Our theoretical results reconcile an apparent conﬂict between the theoretical literature and the
empirical evidence. On the one hand, in arguing that trade credit mitigates credit rationing by banks,
the theoretical literature (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) has highlighted a positive
relation between trade credit and borrowing constraints. On the other hand, some empirical literature
ﬁnds that reliance on trade credit is practically unaﬀected by the degree of credit rationing (Petersen
and Rajan, 1997; Marotta, 2005). This section accounts for both these cases.
Dominant incentive motive. This regime arises when condition (12) is strictly negative.
Proposition 1 There exist three critical levels of wealth, A1 < A2 < A3 such that:
(i) for A ≥ A3 entrepreneurs ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best investment (IFB
t ,IFB
nt ) and take trade credit for
liquidation motives and bank credit as a residual. The share of inputs purchased on credit is equal
to the scrap value of tangible inputs (
βS
rS );













and take trade credit for liquidation motives, with a share
βS
rS ;
10(iii) for A1 ≤ A < A2, entrepreneurs are credit-constrained by banks, invest I∗
t < IFB
t , and I∗
nt < IFB
nt ,
and take trade credit for incentive motives. The share of inputs purchased on credit is decreasing
in wealth and within the interval

βS
rS ,1 − βt
i
;
(iv) for A < A1, entrepreneurs are constrained on both credit lines, invest It (A) < I∗
t and Int (A) < I∗
nt,
and take trade credit for incentive motives. The share of inputs purchased on credit is constant
and equal to the proportion that cannot be diverted, 1 − βt;





nt) + (1 − βt)I∗
t rS − pfH (I∗
t ,I∗




A2 = A1 + 1
rB






























Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. The population of entrepreneurs is distributed into four
wealth areas with diﬀerent degrees of credit rationing. For each area, the ﬁgure shows the motive for
trade credit demand (liquidation or incentive), and the share of inputs purchased on account. Suﬃciently
rich entrepreneurs (A ≥ A3) ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best investment by taking a constant amount of trade
credit, equal to the discounted value of collateralized assets, and a variable amount of bank credit.16
Notice that each unit of trade credit below this amount costs less than bank credit, since the supplier
exploits the greater liquidation revenues accruing in the bad state to decrease the repayment required in
the good state. Using (5), (6) and (8), the price of one unit of trade credit and one unit of bank credit
is given by rS and rB/p, respectively. Under Assumption 2, rS < rB/p. An extra unit of trade credit
above the level set in (10) costs more than bank credit, since there is no more collateral to pledge. This
level is thus the optimal amount of trade credit taken for liquidation motives. As wealth comes down
towards A3, the amount of trade credit stays constant while bank credit increases to compensate for the
lack of internal wealth. For A < A3, the loan needed to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best investment implies a large
repayment obligation that leaves the entrepreneur with a return lower than the return from diversion.
Banks must therefore ration the entrepreneur to prevent opportunistic behavior, whence credit rationing.
Suppliers are still willing to sell inputs on credit because they face a less severe incentive problem. For
A2 ≤ A < A3, however, ﬁrms do not yet increase trade credit demand, since the cost of an extra unit
is still higher than the cost of bank credit. Thus, they are forced to reduce the investment below the
ﬁrst-best level, and also the absolute amount of trade credit and bank ﬁnance, but they keep the share
of inputs purchased on account constant. Only for wealth below A2, does the shadow cost of bank credit
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Figure 1: The regime where the incentive motive dominates
exceed the marginal cost of trade credit. Firms start demanding trade credit also for incentive motives,
i.e., to relax ﬁnancial constraints and keep the investment constant. Thus, the amount of bank credit
stays constant, but both the absolute level of trade credit and the share of tangible inputs purchased
on account rise to their maximum. This is reached at A = A1, when the incentive constraint vis-` a-vis
the supplier also binds. For A < A1, the entrepreneur is constrained on both credit lines and is forced
to reduce investment further. Both trade and bank credit decrease, but the share of inputs purchased
on credit stays constant at its maximum (1 − βt). In summary, across the wealth areas described in
Figure 1, the share of inputs purchased on account is non-decreasing in credit rationing.
Corollary 1 The bank gets a contract with repayments increasing in cash ﬂows for any level of wealth,
while the supplier gets a contract with ﬂat repayments across states when A ≥ A2, and a contract with
repayments increasing in cash ﬂows when A < A2.
According to Corollary 1, the motivation for trade credit demand (incentive or liquidation) also
aﬀects the properties of the ﬁnancial contract between the entrepreneur and the ﬁnanciers. The proof
is straightforward. By Lemma 1, the supplier always gets full priority in case of repossession of the
collateral. Two cases may then arise. Trade credit may be demanded for liquidation motive (A ≥ A2
in Figure 1): the supplier gets the same return across states, equal to the scrap value of unused inputs.
12Alternatively, trade credit is demanded for incentive motives (A < A2 in Figure 1): the value of the
unused scrap inputs is not suﬃcient to repay the supplier. An extra unit of trade credit can be provided
only if higher repayment is promised in the good state. Therefore the supplier gets an increasing
repayment contract, with an extra return for any unit of trade credit taken above the collateral value.
Lastly, the bank always gets a contract with repayment increasing in cash ﬂows. This is because it gets
a positive return only in the good state, given that, by Lemma 1, the collateral is always repossessed
by the supplier.
Dominant liquidation motive. This regime arises when condition (12) is positive or equal to zero.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical level of wealth, ˆ A1, such that:
(i) for A ≥ ˆ A1 entrepreneurs ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best investment (ˆ IFB
t , ˆ IFB
nt ) taking trade credit for
liquidation motives and bank credit as a residual;
(ii) for A < ˆ A1, entrepreneurs are credit-constrained on both bank credit and trade credit. They invest
ˆ It (A) < ˆ IFB
t and ˆ Int (A) < ˆ IFB
nt taking trade credit for liquidation motives;
in either case, the share of inputs purchased on credit equals the scrap value of tangible inputs (
βS
rS ), and
ˆ A1 = 1
rB
n



















Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2 and has the same interpretation as Figure 1. In this case, there
are only two wealth areas. For A ≥ ˆ A1, ﬁrms are wealthy enough to ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best investment
without exhausting their credit lines. They use a constant amount of trade credit, equal to the scrap
value of collateral assets, and, as wealth decreases, an increasing amount of bank credit. The funding
from banks ceases when A = ˆ A1. At this level of wealth, because the amount of inputs ﬁnanced on credit
is already very large, the total funding obtained is so great that an extra amount of it, be it in cash
or in kind, would induce the entrepreneur to divert all resources. Thus, for A < ˆ A1, being ﬁnancially
constrained on both credit lines, entrepreneurs are forced to reduce both sources of external ﬁnancing
as well as the investment level. In contrast with the previous regime, they keep ﬁnancing a constant
share of input by trade credit equal to βS/rS for any level of wealth. They have no incentive to alter it,
since this would increase the total cost of ﬁnancing: each unit of trade credit above the scrap value of
collateral assets is more expensive than bank loans; similarly, each unit below this amount can only be
















Figure 2: The regime where the liquidation motive dominates
is independent of ﬁnancial constraints: both rationed and non-rationed ﬁrms purchase the same share
of inputs on account, as the empirical evidence to date indicates. In this second regime, trade credit is
never demanded to mitigate borrowing constraints but only for liquidation motives.
Corollary 2 The bank gets a contract with repayment increasing in cash ﬂows, while the supplier gets
a contract with constant repayment across states for any level of wealth.
Proof. Because trade credit is taken for liquidation motives and the share of inputs bough on credit
stays constant across wealth and equal to βS/rS, by the same argument used in the proof of Corollary
1, the supplier gets a ﬂat contract, while the bank gets an increasing repayment contract.
3.2 Trade credit demand of ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms
Points (i) of Propositions 1 and 2 focus on unconstrained ﬁrms and deliver a common prediction that
is worth highlighting and discussing separately:
Prediction 1. Financially unconstrained ﬁrms take trade credit in order to exploit their supplier’s
liquidation advantage. The amount of trade credit used equals the collateral value of tangible inputs
pledged to the supplier (equation 10).
This result ﬁlls a gap in the literature. As we saw in Section 1, earlier theories explain the
existence of trade cedit but not its use by unconstrained ﬁrms, an empirical fact (see Petersen and
14Rajan (1997) for the U.S. economy, Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) for Japan and Marotta (2005) for the
Italian manufacturing sector).
Prediction 1 also posits that the use of trade credit is bound to the value of the inputs as collateral, in
line with the evidence of Mian and Smith (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1997).17 This is because the
supplier’s liquidation advantage makes trade credit cheaper than bank loans only up to this collateral
value.18 Therefore, our liquidation story requires that: i) the input has a positive collateral value; ii) it
is worth suﬃciently more to the supplier than to the bank in case of default, which by Lemma 1 implies
supplier’s contractual seniority; iii) the bankruptcy law does not alter the contractually agreed claims
held by creditors. Section 4 discusses these issues further.
Our result thus implies that even though the opportunity cost of funds is higher for input suppliers
than for banks, trade credit can be cheaper than bank loans. This contrasts with the rather high interest
rates implied by standard buyer-seller agreements, generally cited in the related litarature.
The lack of appropriate data has traditionally prevented econometricians from comparing the cost of
funds borrowed from suppliers and from banks. This comparison requires information about the implicit
trade credit rate charged by suppliers to their customers, which cannot be inferred from accounting data.
More recently, however, rich survey data at the ﬁrm level became available.19 Using this information,
several recent papers document that trade credit can indeed be cheaper than bank loans. For example,
Marotta (2005) shows that trade credit provided by Italian manufacturing ﬁrms is not more expensive
than bank credit. Giannetti et al. (2006) document that the majority of the U.S. ﬁrms in their sample
seems to receive cheap trade credit. Fabbri and Klapper (2008) ﬁnd that for over 20% of Chinese ﬁrms
in their sample, trade credit is cheaper than bank loans. Finally, Miwa and Ramseyer (2008) argue
that ﬁrms borrow heavily from their suppliers at implicit rates that track the explicit rates banks would
charge.
In short, the recent evidence on the cost of trade credit and the documented relationship between
the liquidation value and trade credit use seem to be consistent with our story.
17Petersen and Rajan (1997) show that the supplier’s liquidation advantage is one of the determinants of trade credit.
They use the fraction of the ﬁrm’s inventory not consisting of ﬁnished goods to proxy the liquidation advantage, based on
the assumption that when the inputs are converted into ﬁnished goods, the supplier’s liquidation advantage is lost.
18Other works have argued that trade credit may be cheap. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), for example, say that if
suppliers are unconstrained in the bank credit market, the trade credit interest rate might be as low as the bank rate. If
there is a wedge between the banks’ deposit rates and lending rates, the equilibrium trade credit interest rate may end
up strictly below the bank rate. In Frank and Maksimovic (2004), as in our model, trade credit is cheap because of the
liquidation advantage, but they do not derive any prediction for the trade credit demand by unconstrained ﬁrms.
19For example, ﬁrms are asked to report not only the interest rate on bank loans, but also very detailed information
on trade credit terms received from their suppliers. Speciﬁcally, this information includes whether ﬁrms have been oﬀered
a discount on early payments, the extent of the discount and its application period, the number of days before imposing
penalty.
153.3 The role of input characteristics
Let us extend the foregoing analysis to discuss the role of input characteristics in determining which
regime dominates. This extension has a clear economic interpretation and provides several testable
predictions. In our analysis (see inequality (12)), dominance depends on the liquidity of the tangible
input (βt) and its collateral value to the supplier (βS). The incentive motive is more likely to arise
among ﬁrms purchasing inputs that are illiquid or that have low collateral value (Figure 1). Conversely,
the liquidation motive dominates among ﬁrms using relatively liquid or high-value inputs (Figure 2).
Since to some extent the two characteristics of the input reﬂect industry characteristics, we can use
them to classify goods into categories/industries. One possible classiﬁcation would distinguish services
(low liquidity and low collateral value), standardized goods (high liquidity and low collateral value), and
diﬀerentiated products (low liquidity and high collateral value). Using this classiﬁcation, our theory
provides three testable predictions on how the use of trade credit varies across industries.
Prediction 2. Firms buying services make more purchases on account the tighter the credit
constraints, while ﬁrms buying goods (both standardized and diﬀerentiated) ﬁnance the same share
of their purchases on account independently of credit rationing. This prediction can be derived by
comparing the pattern of trade credit use across wealth areas between Figures 1 and 2.
Prediction 3. Firms buying goods (both standardized and diﬀerentiated) make more purchases
on account than ﬁrms buying services. This prediction can be derived by focusing on the right hand
sides of Figures 1 and 2, which isolate the use of trade credit by wealthy ﬁrms. Since these ﬁrms are
unconstrained in the use of trade credit, we interpret them as the demand side of the trade credit
market. This ﬁnding is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Giannetti et al. (2006, p.
20) for ﬁrms taking trade credit.
Prediction 4. Suppliers of services oﬀer more trade credit than suppliers of standardized goods.
This prediction is derived by comparing the left hand sides of Figures 1 and 2, which isolate the
maximum share of inputs purchased on account by poor ﬁrms. As they are constrained on trade credit,
these ﬁrms are up against the supply side of the trade credit market. Since this prediction compares
inputs with the same collateral value but diﬀerent degrees of liquidity, it is useful to represent the






, as a function of
input liquidity, βt. This relation is represented in Figure 3. The pattern is weakly monotonic, in contrast
to Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), who ﬁnd a pattern always decreasing in the liquidity parameter. In
particular, there is a threshold degree of liquidity, ˆ β = 1 −
βS




















Figure 3: Trade credit line and input liquidity for constrained ﬁrms
share of tangible inputs ﬁnanced by trade credit is decreasing in βt. This situation corresponds to the
dashed line in Figure 3. Conversely, if βt ≥ ˆ β, the share is constant, which corresponds to the solid
line. The two patterns capture the two motives for less wealthy ﬁrms to rely on trade credit. When
the incentive motive dominates, this relation is negative because the supplier’s information advantage
becomes more important the more the inputs diﬀer from cash, i.e. the less their liquidity in case of
diversion. Conversely, when the liquidation motive is the driver, the use of trade credit does not depend
on input liquidity. Producers of services are identiﬁed by the upper part of the dashed line (βt ' 0),
producers of standardized goods by the right side of the solid line (βt ' 1). Thus, producers of services
are willing to ﬁnance a larger share of inputs. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence
presented by Giannetti et al. (2006, pp. 15, 17) for ﬁrms supplying trade credit.
3.4 Do suppliers ever lend cash?
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the share of tangible inputs ﬁnanced by suppliers is always less than
one. This means that despite the information advantage suppliers extend credit for their products but
do not lend cash. The empirical evidence that cash lending does occur in Japan (Uesugi and Yamashiro,
2004) thus raises two questions that must be addressed. First, is the information advantage concerning
the supplier’s input always insuﬃcient to induce him to lend cash? And second, what peculiar features
does the Japanese trade credit market have? This section addresses both questions.
The lack of cash lending depends crucially on the assumption that the information advantage
17concerns only the purchase of the inputs provided by the supplier, in our case tangibles.20 If the
advantage extends to the other input as well (for example both creditors can partially but asymmetrically
observe the intangible input purchase), then cash lending will occur. Denoting by δB and δS the degree
of observability of intangibles by bank and supplier respectively, with δS > δB, the incentive constraints
(3) and (4) are replaced by
EP ≥ φ(A + LB − δBInt),
EP ≥ φ(βtIt + A + LB + (LS − It − δSInt)).
Using the resource constraint (7) and assuming that both incentive constraints are binding, the
maximum credit lines oﬀered by suppliers and banks are21
LS = (1 − βt)It + (δS − δB)Int,
LB = Itβt + (1 − δS + δB)Int − A.
The supplier not only provides the inputs and allows deferred repayment for a share equal to 1 − βt of
their value, but also provides an amount of cash to ﬁnance the intangibles equal to a fraction δS − δB
of their value. Hence, in order for there to be cash lending, the supplier must also have an information
advantage over the bank on the intangible input. The bigger this advantage δS − δB, the larger the
amount of cash lending.
Interestingly, Uesugi and Yamashiro (2004) show that in Japan cash is lent by trading companies.
These are large integrated ﬁrms, dealing with a variety of commodities and carrying out a range of
business transactions sometimes including all the stages of production and marketing. Thus, Japanese
trading companies can supply raw materials to manufacturing ﬁrms but also work as sales agents for
them. Commodity transactions are supported by a variety of ﬁnancial service, from trade credit to
long-term and short-term loans, loan guarantees and investment in equities.22 The supplier therefore
provides many types of service to the same buyer. This organization guarantees a continuous ﬂow
of information, enabling the supplier to better monitor its customer. In line with our intuition, the
Japanese evidence suggests that cash lending arises when the supplier’s information advantage extends
to various aspects of the ﬁrm’s activity and is not conﬁned exclusively to the ﬁrm-supplier relationship.
20Parlour and Rajan (2001) show that with multiple cash lenders equilibria are typically not competitive. This implies
that cash lending is naturally exclusive and provides a further reason why suppliers do not lend cash.
21Notice that cash lending can occur only when there is an incentive motive for trade credit. There is no scope for
borrowing cash if liquidation motive dominates.
22Examples include Mitsubishi Companies, Mitsui and Toyota Tsusho Corporation. This kind of business organization
is rare in the rest of the world, except in Korea and China. See Uesugi and Yamashiro (2004) for a detailed description.
183.5 Input tangibility, ﬁnancial decisions and creditor protection
The lack of cash lending implies that trade credit ﬁnances only tangible inputs. It follows that when
a constrained entrepreneur uses trade credit to relax a borrowing constraint, he also distorts the input
mix towards tangibles. This implies a link between ﬁnancing and input choices across diﬀerent levels of
wealth and thus across diﬀerent degrees of borrowing constraint.
We now explore this link and investigate the impact of changes in creditor protection. Greater use
of trade credit goes together with an input bias towards tangible assets, and the bias becomes stronger
when creditor vulnerability increases. The intuition is that since bank credit is more sensitive than trade
credit to moral hazard, weaker creditor protection raises the relative cost of bank ﬁnancing. Rationed
entrepreneurs consequently rely more heavily on trade credit and shift towards more intensive use of
tangible inputs.
We develop this intuition in the next two propositions, which relate asset tangibility, It/Int, and
trade credit intensity, LS/(A + LB + LS), to ﬁrm wealth, A, and to the degree of creditor vulnerability,
φ.23 We restrict our analysis to homothetic functions, which have the property that the optimal input
combination depends only on the input price ratio, in our case Pt/Pnt (tangible over intangible).24
Proposition 3 Both asset tangibility and trade credit intensity are non-increasing in wealth.
Proposition 4 Greater creditor vulnerability increases both asset tangibility and trade credit intensity
for any A < A1 and A2 ≤ A < A3; it increases trade credit intensity and leaves asset tangibility constant
for any A1 ≤ A < A2; it has no eﬀect on either for any A ≥ A3.
Figures 4 and 5 display trade credit intensity and input tangibility for diﬀerent wealth levels. Firms
with A ≥ A3 are unconstrained on both credit lines, so both the price ratios between trade and bank
credit and those between inputs are invariant in wealth. It follows that both trade credit intensity
and input tangibility hold constant for levels of wealth above A3. When wealth falls below A3, the
moral hazard problem vis ` a vis the bank becomes binding. Reductions in wealth within the interval
A2 ≤ A < A3 increase the shadow cost of bank credit and thus decrease the price ratio between the two
sources of funding. Firms give up more bank credit than trade credit, increasing trade credit intensity
(solid line in the interval A2 ≤ A < A3 of Figure 5). The higher price of bank credit also aﬀects the two
input prices, but by a diﬀerent amount. It is translated fully into a higher price of intangibles, as they
23Propositions 3 and 4 refer to the case in which condition (12) is strictly negative (dominating incentive motive).
However, qualitatively similar results hold also for the complementary case (dominating liquidation motive).
24This property simpliﬁes the comparative statics analysis used to derive our results.
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Figure 4: Trade credit intensity, wealth and creditor rights protection
are totally ﬁnanced by bank credit, and only partially into a higher price of tangibles, given that only
the share (1 − βS/rS) is ﬁnanced by bank credit. The input price ratio thus falls for decreasing levels
of wealth, inducing entrepreneurs to increase input tangibility (solid line in the interval A2 ≤ A < A3
of Figure 5).
When wealth falls below A2, the shadow cost of bank credit equals the cost of trade credit. In the
interval A1 ≤ A < A2, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between sources of ﬁnancing, but while they are constrained
by banks, they are still unconstrained by suppliers and can therefore take trade credit at a constant
price to compensate for their lesser wealth. Thus, trade credit intensity increases (solid line in the
interval A1 ≤ A < A2 of Figure 4). This extra credit is used to ﬁnance the purchase of tangibles,
freeing resources to ﬁnance intangibles and leaving the input combination unchanged (solid line in the
interval A1 ≤ A < A2 of Figure 5). Finally, when wealth falls below A1, entrepreneurs are ﬁnancially
constrained on both credit lines. The prices of both sources rise, but bank credit more than trade
credit, given their diﬀerential exposure to moral hazard. As the tangible input is ﬁnanced partly by
trade credit, while the intangible is ﬁnanced entirely by bank credit, the input price ratio decreases,
increasing input tangibility (solid line in the area A < A1 of Figure 5).
Consider now how trade credit intensity and input tangibility respond to an increase in creditor
vulnerability (dotted lines in Figures 4 and 5). Notice ﬁrst that any increase in φ moves all the threshold
levels of A to the right, given that all the incentive constraints become binding at higher levels of wealth.
Firms with A ≥ ¯ A3 are unconstrained on both credit lines and neither trade credit intensity nor asset
tangibility varies. When wealth decreases ( ¯ A2 ≤ A < ¯ A3), the incentive constraint on the bank becomes










Figure 5: Input tangibility, wealth and creditor rights protection
credit and that between inputs increase, inducing entrepreneurs to rely more on trade credit and to shift
towards a technology that relies more on tangible inputs (the dotted lines shift upwards in both graphs).
When ¯ A1 ≤ A < ¯ A2, the two sources of ﬁnance have the same price, but ﬁrms are not constrained by
suppliers and can therefore use trade credit to keep investment and input combination constant (the
dotted line does not shift upwards in Figure 5) and increase trade credit intensity (the dotted line shifts
upwards in Figure 4). When A < ¯ A1, the change in φ makes the entrepreneur’s moral hazard more
severe vis-` a-vis both bank and supplier. The prices of the two sources of ﬁnance and of the two inputs
increase, but bank credit (intangibles) rises more than trade credit (tangibles), since only the fraction
βt of tangibles can be diverted. Thus, both trade credit intensity and asset tangibility increase, as is
shown by the upward shift of the dotted lines in both ﬁgures.
The previous analysis allows us to obtain the following predictions:
Prediction 5. Credit-constrained ﬁrms have higher trade credit intensity and use technologies more
intensive in tangible assets than unconstrained ones.
Moreover, if we assume that countries only diﬀer in the degree of creditor protection:
Prediction 6. When located in countries with weaker creditor protection, credit-constrained ﬁrms
have higher trade credit intensity and a technological bias towards tangibles. Unconstrained ﬁrms have
the same trade credit intensity and input tangibility across countries with diﬀerent degrees of creditor
protection.
Taking into account that credit constrained ﬁrms are more widespread in countries with weaker
creditor protection, Prediction 6 is consistent with two distinct sets of empirical evidence. First, there
21is a greater use of trade credit in countries with less creditor protection, including developing countries
(see among others, Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La Porta et al., 1998; Fisman and Love, 2003; Frank
and Maksimovic, 2004). Second, ﬁrms in developing countries have a higher proportion of ﬁxed to
total assets and fewer intangible assets than those in developed countries (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 2001). Our paper thus oﬀers a theory that reconciles these distinct ﬁndings.
4 The role of the legal framework
The liquidation story discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 presupposes that in case of bankruptcy priority
should be assigned on eﬃciency basis, i.e. to the supplier (γ = 1 by Lemma 1). However, the legal system
may prevent the supplier from seizing particular goods, thus eliminating the liquidation motive for trade
credit and hence “contractual seniority.” One way to obtain this outcome is to design debtor- rather than
creditor-oriented bankruptcy codes, which subordinate all creditor rights, including suppliers’ rights,
to the ﬁrm’s survival. A second, more speciﬁc, way is to establish priority rules that privilege certain
creditors over suppliers. Although a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we can discuss
these two aspects of bankruptcy codes, to understand how they may alter our results.
Regarding the ﬁrst aspect, the French bankruptcy law, for instance, has the stated objective
of helping distressed ﬁrms (Biais and Mariotti, 2003) and favoring their reorganization, with an
automatic stay against secured creditors that prevents them from removing their collateral during the
reorganization period. The German bankruptcy law has similar provisions, with a greater role assigned
to creditors in the decision to reorganize. These two systems can be seen as debtor-oriented, as opposed
to the Anglo-Saxon codes that are traditionally creditor-oriented. The U.S. bankruptcy law gives
managers the choice between ﬁling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 (liquidation) or under Chapter 11
(reorganization). Liquidation can therefore occur without prior reorganization, and according to Franks
et al. (1996), the majority of U.S. bankruptcies are actually processed through Chapter 7.25 In the
U.K., there are two bankruptcy regimes: receivership and administration order. Under the ﬁrst, if a
ﬁrm defaults a creditor holding a general secured interest in its assets, known as a ﬂoating charge, may
appoint a receiver with the right to sell any assets to repay the claim, except those that are subject
to another creditor’s lien.26 To prevent the liquidation of the ﬁrm’s assets, an administration order
can be issued, appointing a bankruptcy oﬃcial with the task of proposing a reorganization plan to the
25They report that in the Central District of the California Bankruptcy Court there were 57,752 Chapter 7 cases pending
as compared with only 6,739 Chapter 11 cases.
26For example those subject to a ﬁxed charge, i.e. with a security on a speciﬁc asset such as heavy machinery.
22creditors’ committee. However, unlike in the U.S., an administration order cannot block a receivership
procedure that has already started, except with the consent of the holder of the ﬂoating charge.
Regarding the more speciﬁc issue of the priority rule, it is generally true that trade credit is junior,
unless it is secured, in which case the supplier can reclaim any good not yet transformed into output.
This limits the types of good that can be secured, generally not intermediate goods or services, but
rather durable goods. One might therefore expect the demand for trade credit to be driven, among
other things, by the seller’s ability to create a lien, hence by input characteristics. Notice that this
prediction is fully in line with our analysis, where we ﬁnd that the liquidation motive is stronger where
the scrap value of the inputs is larger (βS high). In countries like the U.K. and the U.S., trade creditors
also have speciﬁc liquidation rights. In the U.K., suppliers can include a Retention of Title clause in
the sale contract allowing them to reclaim all the goods supplied on credit in case of bankruptcy, as
long as they are distinguishable from other suppliers’ goods. Such Title makes them become ﬁrst in the
order of seniority along with the holders of ﬁxed charges (Franks and Sussman, 2005). In the U.S., even
when the ﬁrm is not under a bankruptcy procedure, the Uniform Commercial Code gives the seller the
right to reclaim the goods sold to an insolvent buyer within ten days after delivery.27
If the eﬀects of such legal provisions are incorporated into our model, the role played by the
liquidation motive will depend on both input and bankruptcy code characteristics. In particular, we
get the following prediction:
Prediction 7. The liquidation motive is more important when the good is durable (βS high), when it
has not been transformed into ﬁnished products (βS high), and when bankruptcy codes protect contractual
rights in general and supplier debt claims in particular (γ high).
This discussion acknowledges the eﬀect of legal institutions on the demand for trade credit, in line
with previous studies, but we also identify a new channel. Legal institutions aﬀect the use of trade credit
through the degree of legal protection granted to the supplier. The economic force is the liquidation
motive. Conversely, in the related literature, legal institutions aﬀect the reliance on trade credit through
the legal protection granted to banks rather than suppliers.
5 Conclusion
The paper investigates the determinants of trade credit and its interactions with borrowing constraints,
input combination and creditor protection. The paper proposes a model of collateralized bank and
27This deadline does not apply if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the seller in writing. See Garvin (1996)
for more details.
23trade credit. Firms use a two-input technology.
We explain the use of trade credit by ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms as the eﬀect of the seller’s
advantage in liquidating the inputs in case of default. This complements previous ﬁnancial theories of
trade credit, which explain its use only by rationed ﬁrms relying on an incentive motive.
By interacting liquidation and incentive motives, we also show that, as ﬁnancial constraints tighten,
the share of inputs purchased on credit may stay constant or increase. The dominance of one regime
or the other depends on input characteristics, such as liquidity and collateral value. We then derive
testable predictions on how trade credit varies among ﬁrms using diﬀerentiated or standardized inputs,
rather than services.
In addition, we ﬁnd that suppliers will only lend inputs that they sell and we identify the conditions
under which they will lend cash. Finally, we show that input and ﬁnancing decisions are strictly related
and both react to changes in creditor protection. More intensive use of trade credit goes together with
an input combination biased towards tangible assets. Weaker creditor protection increases both the
reliance on trade credit and the degree of tangibility of inputs.
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. The most direct would be to test the predictions
derived in Section 3.5 on the relation among input choices, ﬁnancing decisions and legal institutions
empirically. From a theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to explore the eﬀects of the
supplier’s making input provision conditional on the purchase of complementary inputs. In our model
this assumption would imply that the intangible input is partially observable. This generates cash




yσ = fσ(·,·) : state-contingent output with σ ∈{H,L}
p : probability of state σ = H
qt : purchase of tangible input
qnt : purchase of intangible input
It : investment in tangible input
Int : investment in intangible input
βt : degree of liquidity of the tangible input
φ : degree of creditor rights vulnerability
A : entrepreneur’s wealth
LB : bank credit
LS : supplier credit
βS : value of one unit of collateral asset to the supplier
βB : value of one unit of collateral asset to the bank
rB : bank’s cost of raising one unit of funds on the market
rS : supplier’s cost of raising one unit of funds on the market
Rσ
B : state-contingent repayment due to the bank
Rσ
S : state-contingent repayment due to the supplier
γ,(1 − γ) : share of collateral obtained in case of default by bank and supplier, respectively
Appendix 2











st EP ≥ max{φ(A + LB),φ[βtIt + A + LB − (It − LS)]} (13)
LS R (1 − βt)It (14)
pRH
B + (1 − p)γβBC = LBrB (15)
pRH
S + (1 − p)(1 − γ)βSC = LSrS (16)
A + LB + LS = Int + It (17)
RH
S ≥ (1 − γ)βSC (18)
Notice that the return from diversion in the incentive constraint (13) is expressed as the maximum
between cash-only diversion and input-and-cash diversion. Which one of the two is higher depends
on how many inputs the entrepreneur buys on credit in equilibrium, i.e. how much trade credit
he uses. If LS ≤ (1 − βt)It, the return from cash diversion is no less than the return from input-
and-cash diversion. The relevant temptation facing the entrepreneur in this case is to divert all cash
(A + LB ≥ βtIt + A + LB − (It − LS)). If LS > (1 − βt)It, instead, the return from cash diversion is
strictly less than the return from input-and-cash diversion. The entrepreneur may then be tempted to
25borrow cash from the bank, buy inputs on credit from the supplier and divert both cash and inputs.
Whether in equilibrium LS R (1 − βt)It depends on the amount of trade credit that is taken for
liquidation motives.
Deﬁnition 1 The threshold level of φ below which a zero-wealth ﬁrm can carry out the level
of investment which is optimal by using both bank credit and trade credit is given by φ =
pfH(It,Int)−(Int+It)rB+(rB−rS)LS+(1−p)(γβB+(1−γ)βS)It
Int+It−LS , where It,Int solve the ﬁrst order conditions of







Proof of Lemma 1. Under assumption 2, the entrepreneur takes trade credit to exploit the
supplier’s liquidation advantage. Solving (15) and (16) for RH
B and RH
S , (18) sets the minimum demand
for trade credit as LS ≥ (1 − γ)
βS
rS It. Assuming this to be binding and using it in PG, we get:
max
It,Int,LB,γ
EP = pfH (It,Int) − LBrB − p(1 − γ)βSC + (1 − p)γβBC (19)




A + LB +
(1−γ)βS
rS C − (1 − βt)It
o
(20)
A + LB +
(1−γ)βS
rS C = Int + It (21)













rB + (1 − p)γβBC (22)











Deﬁning λ1 as the multiplier of constraint (23), the Lagrangean is:

















p(βS − βB) − 1
rS (rBβS − rSβB)







Under Assumption 2, ∂ΛF
∂γ ≤ 0, which implies that γ = 0 and proves the lemma.28




rS It,(1 − βt)It
i
and the relevant incentive constraint in (13) is the one vis-` a-vis the
bank.
The proposition is proved in steps: we ﬁrst prove that a) Ii (AA<A1) < I∗
i < Ii (AA2≤A<A3) < IFB
i ,
i = t,nt; then that b) the critical levels A1, A2 and A3, exist and are unique. To establish part a), we
ﬁrst focus on A ≥ A2, where the entrepreneur demands trade credit only for liquidation motives, and




∂γ = 0, γ ∈ [0,1]. We take it to be zero.
26The entrepreneur takes trade credit only to exploit the supplier’s liquidation advantage and
LS =
βS
rS It < (1 − βt)It. The problem is to solve programme PF, where the relevant incentive constraint




















∂Int − rB = λ1
1+λ1φ (27)
∂ΛF





















Within A ≥ A2, we further distinguish two wealth areas: A ≥ A3 and A2 ≤ A < A3.
A ≥ A3 : In this case the incentive constraint (23) is slack and the ﬁrm invests IFB
t , IFB
nt solving































A2 ≤ A < A3 : The incentive constraint (23) is binding and the ﬁrm invests Ii (A) ∈ [I∗
i ,IFB
i ),
where Ii (A), i = t,nt, solve (26) and (27) with λ1 > 0.
To prove that I∗
i < IFB
i , consider the FOC’s (26) and (27). Relative to the ﬁrst-best (λ1 = 0), there
is now an increase in the cost of both factors. In order to derive the implications of such rise on the

























where dPt > 0, dPnt > 0 are the changes in the cost of factors induced by a change in one of their




























where H is the determinant of the Hessian, which is positive assuming the Hessian to be negative
semi-deﬁnite. Thus, if factors are substitutes, i.e.
∂2f(·,·)
























27which implies that both factors are under-invested.29
The optimal ﬁnancial contract has the following properties:
RH
S = βSIt (A),
LS = 1
rSβSIt (A),











Int (A) + 1
rS (rS − βS)It (A) − A

where It (A), Int (A) solve (26), (27) and (28) with λ1 > 0.
A < A2.
The entrepreneur is still constrained on bank credit, but, unlike the case in which A2 ≤ A < A3,
the shadow price of bank credit is so high that he ﬁnds it worthwhile to take trade credit not only for
liquidation, but also for incentive motives. Thus LS >
βS
rS It.30 However, to persuade the supplier to
increase ﬁnancing, the entrepreneur has to oﬀer him a contract with repayments increasing in cash
ﬂows. Thus, the non-decreasing repayments condition (18) is slack. The optimal contract solves
programme PG subject to the binding incentive constraint (13) vis-` a-vis the bank and to constraint
(14) as LS ≤ (1 − βt)It. Solving the resource constraint (17) for LS, programme PG can be written as:
max
It,Int,LB
EPI = pfH (It,Int) − LBrB − (It + Int − A − LB)rS + (1 − p)βSIt (30)
s.t. EPI = φ(A + LB) (31)
LB ≥ Int + βtIt − A (32)
which, using binding (31), becomes:
max
It,Int
EPGI = pfH (It,Int) − (Int − A)rB − [(1 − βt)rS + βtrB − (1 − p)βS]It
s.t. EPGI ≥ φ{βtIt + Int} (33)
where (33) is the global incentive constraint. Setting up the Lagrangean ΛG = EPGI +










∂Int − rB = λ2
1+λ2φ (35)
∂ΛG
∂λ2 : EPGI − φ(βtIt + Int) ≥ 0 (36)




∂It + βS (1 − p) − rS (1 − βt) = pβt
∂fH
∂Int. (37)
Within A < A2, we can further distinguish between two wealth areas: A1 ≤ A < A2 and A < A1.
29Notice that this result holds also for the case in which factors are complements, provided the Hessian has a dominant
diagonal.
30This is feasible since the amount of trade credit taken for liquidation does not exhaust the maximum credit line oﬀered
by the supplier to a rationed entrepreneur (11) (recall that we are in the case in which 1 − βt >
βS
rS ).
28A1 ≤ A < A2 : The incentive constraint (33) is slack (λ2 = 0). This implies that the entrepreneur
can keep investing I∗
t ,I∗
nt even for decreasing levels of wealth until (33) becomes binding. The properties
























































nt solve (34) and (35) with λ2 = 0.31
A < A1 : The incentive constraint vis-` a-vis the supplier becomes binding (λ2 > 0) and (34) and
(35) imply that It (A) < I∗
t , and Int (A) < I∗
nt.32 The contract has the following properties:
LS = (1 − βt)It (A)
LB = Int + βtIt (A) − A
RH
S = 1
p ((1 − βt)rS − (1 − p)βS)It (A)
RH
B = 1
p (Int (A) + βtIt (A) − A)rB
where It (A), Int (A) solve (34)/(35) and (36).
Part (b) is proved using the following lemma:
Lemma 2 For any rB +φ > rS and 1−βt >
βS







− ¯ LBrB − pβSIFB
t − φ
 
A + ¯ LB













nt) − ¯ LBrB − pβSI∗
t − φ
 
A + ¯ LB













nt)− ¯ LBrB − ¯ LSrS +(1 − p)βSI∗
t −φ
 
A + ¯ LB

= 0 for A = A1 (p,rB,rS,φ,βS,βt), with
¯ LB = βtI∗
t + I∗
nt − A and ¯ LS = (1 − βt)I∗
t ;
4. A3 > A2 > A1 > 0.
Proof.
1. : The threshold A3 (p,rB,rS,φ,βS) is the minimum wealth that allows the entrepreneur to invest
IFB
t ,IFB
nt fully exploiting the bank credit line and taking trade credit only for liquidation motives.33
31Notice that, while the level of the two inputs is constant in the above interval, the repayments due to bank and supplier
in the two states vary with wealth.
32The proof of this result is analogous to the one obtained for the case in which A2 ≤ A < A3 and thus omitted.


































To prove that this threshold exists and is unique we need to show that: (1a) 0+¯ LB+LS,LM < IFB
t +IFB
nt ,
which follows from Assumption 1 (φ > φ); (1b) ¯ LB is continuously increasing in A. To establish part
(1b), it is useful to deﬁne the following functions, obtained by taking the derivatives of constraint (23)
wrt It and Int respectively:
ht1 = p
∂fH









∂Int − rB − φ (40)
Constraint (23) is only binding if ht1,hnt1 < 0, otherwise It and Int could be further increased without
violating the constraint.
Using (7) and (10), we deduce that It = A+LB−Int
(rS−βS) rS. The maximum bank credit line ¯ LB,















A + ¯ LB

















































. The denominator is negative whenever constraint (23) binds, i.e. when
ht1 < 035 (otherwise it would be possible to raise the credit limit ¯ LB, and thus raise either It or Int,







rS−βS − φ = rB − 1
1+λ1φ. Because the right hand side is positive (
φ
1+λ < 1),
the numerator of d¯ LB
dA is also positive and the whole expression is positive.





nt fully exploiting the bank credit line and taking trade credit still for liquidation





















The proof of existence and uniqueness of A2 is analogous to the proof of point 1 and is omitted.
3. : The threshold A1 (p,rB,rS,φ,βS,βt) is the minimum wealth that allows the entrepreneur to
invest still I∗
t , I∗






nt) + (1 − βt)I∗
t rS − pfH (I∗
t ,I∗




To prove that A1 exists and is unique we need to show that: (3a) at zero wealth the amount of
funding raised by the bank and the supplier is strictly less than the second-best investment, i.e.
34Recall that we are in the case in which the relavant incentive constraint is the one vis-` a-vis the bank.
35It can be deduced by rearranging (39).
300 + ¯ LB + ¯ LS = I∗
t + I∗
nt; (3b) ¯ LB and ¯ LS are continuously increasing in A. Part (3a) follows from
Assumption 1 (φ > φ). To establish part (3b) it is helpful to deﬁne the following functions, obtained
taking the derivative of (33) wrt It and Int :
ht2 = p
∂fH
∂It − βtrB − (1 − βt)rS + (1 − p)βS − φβt (43)
hnt2 = p
∂fH
∂Int − (rB + φ). (44)
Constraint (33) is only binding if ht2,hnt2 < 0, otherwise It and Int could be further increased without
violating it.
We ﬁrst prove that d¯ LB
dA > 0. Using (7) and (11), it follows that It = A+LB−Int
βt . Substituting out in













A + ¯ LB

(45)




















∂It − βt (rB + φ) − (1 − βt)rS + (1 − p)βS
o 












βt ((1 − βt)rS − (1 − p)βS)
o
dInt = 0
Using (37), the multiplier of dInt is zero, while the multiplier of d¯ LB is ht2. Solving for d¯ LB
dA and





∂It − rS (1 − βt) + (1 − p)βS − βtφ

/ht2, whose sign depends on
the sign of the numerator, given that the denominator is negative. Using the FOC on It, (34), and
rB > φ, we deduce that the sign of the numerator is always positive, whence d¯ LB
dA > 0.
To complete the proof we need to show that d¯ LS
dA > 0. To prove this, we use the same procedure
used to show that d¯ LB
dA > 0. Using (7) and (11), it follows that It = LS
1−βt and LB =
βt
1−βtLS − A + Int.













¯ LS + ArB − (rB + φ)Int = 0. (46)












∂Int − (rB + φ)
o
dInt + rBdA = 0
which, using ht2 and hnt2, we write as:
1
1−βtht2d¯ LS + hnt2dInt + rBdA = 0 (47)
Totally diﬀerentiating (37), we obtain:
p
1−βt (ftt − βtfnt.t)d¯ LS + p(ft.nt − βtfnt.nt)dInt = 0. Solving
for dInt = − 1
1−βt (ftt − βtfnt.t)(ft.nt − βtfnt.nt)
−1 d¯ LS, and substituting out in (47), we can solve for
d¯ LS







4. A3 > A2 > A1 > 0.
31To prove that A3 > A2, we have to confront the levels of wealth obtained from the binding incentive
constraint (23) when Ii = IFB
i and Ii = I∗
i , i = t,nt, respectively. This amounts to calculate the eﬀect
of a change in It or Int on A3 leaving the incentive constraint unaltered. Totally diﬀerentiating the














(dIt + dInt) − pβSdIt + rBdA = 0
whence dA





















∂Int − rB − φ

.
Whenever the incentive constraint binds, the terms in brackets, ht1,hnt1 are negative, which implies
that dA
dIt, dA
dInt > 0. Thus, as It,Int decrease, A decreases, which proves that A3 > A2.
To prove that A2 > A1, we compare (23) and (33). Since within this wealth area the level of
investment is unchanged and equal to I∗
t ,I∗
nt, we only need to compare parameters. This leads to
A2 − A1 = 1
rB





(rB + φ − rS)I∗
t > 0. Hence, A2 > A1.
Finally, A1 > 0 follows from Assumption 1 (φ > φ).
Proof of Proposition 2. (Dominant liquidation regime) When
βS
rS ≥ (1 − βt), LS =
βt
rSIt
and the relevant incentive constraint in (13) is the one vis-` a-vis the supplier.
The line of the proof is similar to that followed in the proof of Proposition 1. Given that (18) is
binding, the maximization problem for any level of wealth is the one given by programme PF. Setting














∂Int − rB = λ1
1+λ1φ (49)
∂ΛF
∂λ1 : EPF ≥ φ(Int + βtIt) (50)











∂Int − rB (51)
We can distinguish between two cases, according to whether A ≥ ˆ A1 or A < ˆ A1.
A ≥ ˆ A1: The incentive constraint (23) is slack and ˆ IFB
t , ˆ IFB
nt solve (48) and (49) with λ1 = 0. The
optimal ﬁnancial contract has the following properties:
RH




























Thus, the supplier gets ﬂat repayments across states for the funding provided, getting the collateral in
case of default, while the bank gets an increasing repayment contract.
A < ˆ A1: The incentive constraint (23) becomes binding and ˆ Ik, ˆ IN solve (48)/(49) and (50). Under
the assumption that factors are substitutes, (48) and (49) imply that ˆ Ik < ˆ IFB
t , and ˆ IN < ˆ IFB
nt .36 The
36The proof of this result is analogous to the one obtained for the case in which A2 ≤ A < A3 for Proposition 1 and
thus omitted.
32contract has the following properties:
RH
S = βS ˆ Ik,
LS = 1
rSβS ˆ Ik,

















ˆ Ik − A

Part (b) is proved using the following lemma:
Lemma 3 For any 1 − βt ≤
βS




t , ˆ IFB
L

− ¯ LBrB − ¯ LSrS + (1 − p)βS ˆ IFB
t − φ
n
A + ¯ LB + ¯ LS − (1 − βt) ˆ IFB
t
o














Proof. The threshold ˆ A1 (·) is the minimum wealth that allows the entrepreneur to invest ˆ IFB
t , ˆ IFB
L
fully exploiting both credit lines.37 This level must satisfy:
ˆ A1 = 1
rB
n















t , ˆ IFB
nt
io
To prove that this threshold exists and is unique we need to show that: (i) 0 + ¯ LB + ¯ LS < ˆ IFB
t + ˆ IFB
nt ,
which follows from assumption 1 (φ > φ); (ii) ¯ LB and ¯ LS are continuously increasing in A.
To establish part (ii), it is useful to deﬁne the following functions, obtained by taking the derivatives




rS [(rS − βS)rB + prSβS + φrSβt] (52)
hnt3 = p
∂fH(·,·)
∂Int − rB − φ (53)
Constraint (23) is only binding if ht3,hnt3 < 0, otherwise It and Int could be further increased without
violating the constraint.
We ﬁrst prove that ∂¯ LB
∂A > 0. Using (7) and (10), we deduce that It = A+LB−Int
(rS−βS) rS. The binding












rB + pβS + φβt
o
A+¯ LB−Int


















































hnt3 − ht3 (55)





t = ˆ I
FB
k + ˆ I
FB
nt .
33After some manipulations,38 this reduces to






Given that 1 − βt <
βS
rS and knowing that hnt3 < 0 whenever the incentive constraint binds, we deduce
that (55), and thus the multiplier of dInt in (54), is positive. Hence, (54) writes as









∂It − [pβS + φβt]
o
dA = 0 (57)
Totally diﬀerentiating (51) and recalling that It = A+¯ LB−Int
(rS−βS) rS, we get:
rS
(rS−βSβt) (ftt − βtfnt.t)
 
dA + d¯ LB − dInt

+ (ft.nt − βtfnt.nt)dInt = 0.
Solving for dInt, we get dInt = −
rS
(rS−βS)(ftt−βtfnt.t)(dA+d¯ LB)
den(dInt) , where den(dInt) = ft.nt − βtfnt.nt −
rS
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>0 z }| { h
p
∂fH











Using ht3,hnt3, fii < 0 and fij > 0 and using the FOC on It (48), we deduce that the numerator of ∂¯ LB
∂A
is negative. The sign of ∂¯ LB
∂A depends on the sign of the denominator. Using the equality of (55) with






= ht3den(dInt) − rS
































which is unambiguously negative. This completes the proof that ∂¯ LB
∂A > 0.
The last step is to show that ∂¯ LS






and It = rS
βSLS. The incentive constraint vis-` a-vis the supplier (20) can therefore be written as a function







− Int,(rB + φ) −
¯ LS
βS {(rS − βS)rB + pβSrS + φβtrS} + ArB = 0











∂Int − (rB + φ)
o






rS [(rS − βS)rB + rSpβS + βtrSφ]
o
d¯ LS = 0
which, using ht3, hnt3, we can write as:
hnt3dInt + rBdA + rS
βSht3d¯ LS = 0 (58)
Totally diﬀerentiating (51), we get: dInt = rS
βS (ftt − βtfnt.t)(ft.nt − βtfnt.nt)
−1 d¯ LS. Plugging this in (58)










. Given the assumptions on the production
function, ∂¯ LS
∂A is certainly positive whenever the incentive constraint (20) binds, i.e. when ht3,hnt3 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the assumption that the production function is homothetic, the
input tangibility (It/Int) only depends on the input price ratio (Pt/Pnt). Using the proof of Proposition
1, we can write Pt/Pnt as a function of the parameters of the model. Let us consider the four wealth
areas separately.



















. Notice that trade
credit intensity, (LS/(A + LB + LS)), is increasing in input tangibility (It/Int). Since
∂(Pt/Pnt)
∂A = 0 and
trade credit intensity depends on wealth only through It/Int, both input tangibility and trade credit
intensity are independent of A.






















































(1+λ1)2 > 0, since ∂λ













Given that LS/(A + LB + LS) depends on wealth only through It/Int, both input tangibility and trade
credit intensity are decreasing in A.



























input tangibility is independent of A, trade credit intensity is decreasing in A.








































(1+λ1)2 > 0, since ∂λ





= βS(1−p)−(1−βt)rS ≤ 0 when (1−βt) ≥
βs
rs, which
39This follows from Proposition 2 and from Figure 2. The intuition is the following: when A = A2, the ﬁrm uses a
share of trade credit equal to βS/rS and the shadow cost of bank credit equals the cost of trade credit. Since the ﬁrm is
constrained on bank credit but still unconstrained on trade credit, any reduction in wealth is compensated by a rise in




nt. Thus the share of trade trade credit increases until it reaches (1 − βt) when
A = A1.
35corresponds to the dominant incentive regime we are considering. Since LS/(A + LB + LS) depends on
wealth only through It/Int, both input tangibility and trade credit intensity are decreasing in wealth.
Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that, from the proof of Proposition 3, trade credit intensity is
an increasing function of input tangibility. Let us consider separately the four relevant wealth areas.
When A ≥ A3,
∂(Pt/Pnt)
∂φ = 0. It follows that It/Int is independent of φ. However since φ aﬀects
trade credit intensity only through the input combination, also trade credit intensity is independent of
φ.
When A2 ≤ A < A3, the sign of the derivative
∂(Pt/Pnt)







(−pβS). Since (∂λ1/∂φ) > 0, the whole expression is negative. This implies that
asset tangibility increases in φ. Since a change in φ aﬀects trade credit intensity through the input
combination, also LS/(A + LB + LS) is increasing in φ.
When A1 ≤ A < A2,
∂(Pt/Pnt)
∂φ = 0, which implies that It/Int is independent of φ. However, since
∂µ
∂φ > 0, LS/(A + LB + LS) is increasing in φ. When φ increases, the shadow cost of bank credit equals
the cost of trade credit at ¯ A2 > A2. For decreasing A, the ﬁrm substitutes bank credit with trade
credit, thereby increasing the absolute level of trade credit from βSI∗
t /rS at A = ¯ A2 to (1 − βt)I∗
t at
A = ¯ A1 > A1.
When A < A1, the sign of the derivative
∂(Pt/Pnt)
∂φ depends







[(1 − βt)rS − βS (1 − p)]. Since (∂λ/∂φ) > 0 and the term in square
brackets is negative, the whole expression is negative.40 This implies that asset tangibility increases.
Since φ aﬀects trade credit intensity only through the input combination, also LS/(A + LB + LS) is
increasing in φ.
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